Topic: Corruption
Exclusive
The Business Side of Pirate Ransoms
Mohammad Saaili Shibin, Convicted Pirate
L. Todd Spencer/The Virginian-Pilot/AP
Mohammad Saaili Shibin, Convicted Pirate

The US government is strutting and crowing about another lifetime conviction for a pirate. Billed as "the highest-ranking pirate ever brought to U.S. shores to face charges," Mohammed Saalil Shibin's capture and conviction says more about the US understanding of piracy than its ability to shut it down via legal or military intimidation. The convicted is a 56 year old, Qhardo-born, former unemployed NGO-turned-ransom negotiating ace, He is not actually a pirate in the classic sense but rather an land based interpreter who worked with a number of pirates, shipowners and security companies to negotiate ransoms and the release of ships and crew. He would board hijacked ships but most of his work was done over the phone.

Shibin was found guilty of piracy, kidnapping and hostage-taking in the February 2011 hijacking of the SV Quest and for the capture for the seizure of a German merchant ship in 2010 and given mandatory life in prison for piracy. Despite what the US justice system would have you believe, Shibin was and is just one of many interlocutors hired to negotiate ransoms. He just happened to pick up the phone on the wrong kidnap. All that is really needed to be employed as a pirate negotiator is a mobile phone, a pocket of SIM cards, language skills, and a little entrepreneurial gravitas. A recent United Nations Report identified five "important negotiators" of which Shibin was just one of five names listed.

FBI Assistant Director in Charge Janice K. Fedarcyk announced, "The stiff sentence handed down today sends a clear message to others who would interfere with American vessels or do harm to Americans on the high seas: Whatever seas you ply, you are not beyond the reach of American justice, and you will be held accountable for your actions."

The problem is that for every Shibin that is taken out of the game there are dozens of eager replacements standing by.

Harsh Penalties, Harsher Repercussions

Deja vu? On February 16th, 2011 Galkayo-born, Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse was sentenced to 405 months in United States federal prison for his participation in the April 8, 2009 hijacking of the Maersk Alabama. The pirates demanded $3.5 million but their plans for a smooth ransom negotiation were sent into a violent spin by the arrival of a special operations team of American commandos.

That harsh sentence is similar to what child molesters, murders and con artists get in the United States, except that Muse pleaded guilty and there were no laws against piracy in his home country. Muse didnt' seem like the sharpest pirate. He had no idea how old he was - somewhere between 16 and 26 was his best guess and he spent much of his very public arrival in the US beaming like he had won the lottery. The diminutive 5' 2" Muse was both lucky having captured two other ships previously and unlucky, since he was the only surviving member of his pirate gang left alive after the violent outcome of Navy SEAL rescue operation.

Self professed pirate Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse enjoying his visit to the United States
©Getty Images
Self professed pirate Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse enjoying his visit to the United States
He might actually be lucky in being sentenced to spend 33 years and 9 months in a Terre Haute Indiana prison. At around $34,000 a year, this show of justice will cost the taxpayers at least a million dollars, not including the rescue, trial and incarceration.

So with three clean head shots, the surviving pirate confessing, a stiff sentence handed down that should be it for any further attacks on U.S. vessels.

On February 19th, only three days after Muse's much publicized sentence, the SV Quest, a yacht with four Americans loaded down with bibles was taken south of Oman. The taking of the yacht was actually spurred by the cruel sentence and the desire of the Somalia pirates to free their friends from captivity in the United States. Thankfully US flagged ships are rare and pirates aren’t that picky but the timing was embarrassing to the US government. In reality the undefended yacht was just another easy target for sharp-eyed pirates. The pirates knew that individual captives would bring between $500K and $1 million making the four hostages worth as much as an entire commercial vessel and crew five times the size. They also knew very well that three of their kinfolk had been killed by US snipers just a few months earlier. But the message sent by the US military and justice system didn’t even slow them down. America reacted to the yacht hijacking with a force only equalled in Michael Bey films.

But the sight of the USS Enterprise and three massive US warships 600 yards off apparently didn’t phase the 19 pirates crammed on to the 58 foot yacht.

The owners of the yacht SV Quest had set off from California in 2004 to sail around the world. Jean and Scott Adam of Marina del Rey, Calif., along with co-sailors Bob Riggle and Phyllis Macay of Seattle thought they would break off from a yacht race to distribute some bibles. Little did they know, there were about to get caught between a badly handled rescue attempt and the heartless rage of the pirates. Shibin was the pirate negotiator who was called in to get best price on four newly kidnapped American sailors onboard the SV Quest. The problem was that there were two groups of pirates. One demanded that that their compatriots in the US be returned in exchange for the four Americans and the other group was looking for cash. An act of piracy was escalated into a bloodbath. It was actually the lack of skilled negotiation that led to the deaths of the four Americans.

To show the kidnapping of Americans would not be tolerated, "Four U.S. Navy warships comprised the response force dedicated to recovering the SV Quest: the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the guided-missile cruiser USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55), the guided-missile destroyers USS Sterett (DDG 104) and USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)," according to the US Navy's CENTCOM.

Never Negotiate With Pirate Sea Teams or SEAL Teams

On February 21st, an FBI hostage negotiating team was flown on board the Sterett, as were Somali pirates. These federal agents made the fatal mistake of trying to negotiate with the motley crew of amped-up pirates instead of the investors. The US terms were that the pirates could leave the hostages and take the yacht. They had it backwards.

They realized too late that Somalis who have the disposition to board ships at full sail from tiny skiffs are not psychologically inclined or trained in the finer points of negotiation. The yacht was slowed in the water, two pirates were taken on board the USS Sterret and after four days, an RPG was fired in frustration at the warship by the pirates and shots began to be heard aboard the yacht. A boarding party of SEALS desperately tried to overpower the pirates to save the hostages but arrived too late.

A measure of the desperate attack was this was the most recent publicized time that a US Navy sailor has killed an enemy with a knife. But was this bravery and negotiating stance the right approach?

Had the Navy waited for the ship to reach shore and Shibin to negotiate the going price for a foreigner with family members, history shows that all four would be alive today. It would then be left to the US military to bring the kidnappers and negotiators to justice on their terms. The argument could be made that Shibin could have saved the lives of the four Americans had the normal non-lethal business model of the pirates been kept in place.

Federal prosecutors are now seeking the execution of Ahmed Muse Salad, Abukar Osman Beyle and Shani Nurani Shiekh Abrar for the SV Quest hijacking. All but four of the 26 counts filed in Norfolk, Virginia are eligible for the death penalty. Of the 15 pirates, ten have pleaded guilty, three were charged with the crime of killing the American sailors. Once again there is little to indicate that this will have any impact on piracy or pirates. But going after the sea crews and negotiators seems to be the only concrete movement.

Captured Somali pirates aboard an Indian Navy ship
©Indian Navy
Captured Somali pirates aboard an Indian Navy ship

There is no argument that pirates, whether they murder or not, deserve the harshest punishment. But there is no proof that the effort spent applying international law in foreign courts and jails or even directing the full force of the world's most powerful warships has any impact on the crime of piracy. Thousands of pirates have been killed, imprisoned, caught and released and statistics show that although success rates are dramatically down, pirates range further and more violently in their quest for riches. If anything pirate tactics are becoming harsher and negotiators tougher. Although hijackings have dropped due to on board security, the zeal and attempts of pirates maintain high. An overly simplistic solution but an effective and relatively cheap one compared to steaming battleships around the vast Indian Ocean.

America is just one of many nations who go through the expense and effort of convicting and incarcerating Somali pirates thinking that somehow this will dissuade other Somalia’s from taking to the sea to find riches. There are over 1400 pirates in jail in over 20 countries. Most of them (including king pins like Booyah) in Puntland, a place where their families can visit every Friday. When Somalia Report visiting Bosaso prison a 13 year old pirate was unfazed by being in jail with his heroes. So much for setting an example.

Disposable Negotiators for Precious Cargo

The primary skill in being a negotiator is the ability to speak the language of the ship's owner. Typically this is English, the lingua franca of seafarers. A phone is required. Typically it is the ship's satellite phone but can be transferred to a land based mobile phone or if the ship is parked close enough to shore, the local mobile system which is excellent. Multiple SIM cards must be used and it is important to whipsaw the owners. Many owners are forced to handle their own negotiations, other's rely on British, offshore or nationally based security companies. These companies have trained men who have a list of gambits and ploys to deal with pirate hagglers.

Typical negotiator moves would be trying to go around the assigned professional negotiators, filming sobbing hostages (complete with hankie wiping) to post on YouTube, calling Somalia Report and other media outlets, with dire descriptions of ill health, moving maritime hostages on land and vice versa, replacing negotiators to reboot deals, beating hostages while on the phone, reneging on deals at the last minute, making hostages call their loved ones and in some extreme cases amputation, burning and execution.

It must be remembered that the classic business model of Somali piracy is based on keeping the ship, cargo and crew intact and working within known insurance payouts. Violence, damage or bad faith only encourage violent intervention.

The levels a negotiator must deal with are:

1) Nothing. In the case of ships like the MV Iceberg and many dhows there simply is no return on the pirates crime;

2) Token amounts paid due to local pressure, typically only valid for Somali owned ships $60K - $150K;

3) Accept hull insurance level payments. Likely around the value of the ship somewhere between $2.5M to $5M depending on value of ship;

4) Get a negotiated insurance payment, now ranging between $1.5M and $12M or;

5) Interdiction, arrest or death. Something certain countries like the US, South Korea, Iran, Russia, UAE lean towards. India has had over 500 of its sailors kidnapped but has an on and off again policy to rescue them. The Philippines has had the largest number of captives with over 800 of its nationals kidnapped since 2006 and does little to nothing. Negotiators also must make sure they get paid. That is why they will be found aboard ship and take great pains to set up the specific terms of the ransom drop. Piracy is a crime in plain site and clearly tolerated as a cost of doing business by some nations.

Negotiators Targeted by Law Enforcement

The focus on negotiators and junior members of sea teams may an interesting example of where anti-piracy is staring at the wrong end of the elephant. The investors and western negotiators should bear more scrutiny. Or at least international law enforcement should admit how easy it is to capture both sea teams and negotiators. Since the majority of those captured have pleaded guilty there seems even less value in keeping them as guests for most of their lives. The arrest of Shibin was carried March out by the Puntland Intelligence Services while he was casually having tea in a public place in Bosaso. There was not much to indicate that Shibin was on the run or hiding from arrest. The FBI took credit for the supposedly daring arrest inside Somalia but in truth actually picked up Shibin in April from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. Shibin is a known entity who has negotiated ship and crew ransoms before. Had the US Navy done as much research as Shibin did on the hostages they would have learned that pirates don’t normally kill or even harm their hostages. In many cases pirates have actually signed contracts specifying not only the ransom as well as the exact release details of their hostages and ship. It is the very open nature of this crime that makes law enforcement bombast sound suspect.

The black art of negotiating between pirates and representatives of the victims is an area that is deliberately left unexamined. Why? Because despite public denials, ransom payments of millions of dollars involves governments, law enforcement, monetary control groups, banks and security organizations to pay ransoms. It requires insurance companies to plan on profiting from insurance premiums, banks making large cash withdrawals, anti crime and corruption organizations approving payments for criminal extortion, security companies charging impressive fees for negotiation and delivering those ransoms and a less than stringent eye on exactly where $50 to $150M in cash vanishes every year. Even a recent grossly inaccurate and inflated academic estimate of $7 billion in "piracy costs" steadfastly refuse to be turned into estimates of "profits" from piracy.

At the bottom of this food chain are the negotiators who get a small percentage after the investors, holders and sea teams take their cut.

Although Shibin can be sentenced to life for what he does, what about the negotiators on the other side who have consistently and reliably placed hundreds of millions of dollars into kidnappers hands?

Negotiators: Criminals or Saviors?

It took the Somali government to put a sharper point on this concept. On May 24th 2011 the TFG took the unusual step of actually arresting a crew of six ransom droppers and confiscating the $3.6 million dollars, two expensive aircraft and putting them on trial. A month later after a quick kangaroo court behind closed doors the employees of security company Salama Fikira were sentenced to 15 years in a Somalia jail. It didn’t seem to matter that the TFG doesn’t actually have any laws against piracy. The whole matter was quietly 'fixed' but the $3.6 million is yet to be accounted for. This mirrors the pirates' mantel of respectability that they are saving the seas and protecting fishermen by hijacking and abusing mariners and shipping companies. Aren’t payers and negotiators of ransoms extending the time in captivity, enriching criminals and supporting the bubble of Somali piracy?

Bauer and Ballarin

Julian Bauer, Ecoterra

The industry has evolved from clumsy amateurs to slick professionalism. Previous documented attempts by Andrew Mwangura, Julian Bauer and Michelle Ballarin (who calls herself 'Princess Amira') to negotiate ransoms with pirates have been mostly ignored by the media and law enforcement. The effect of western hostage negotiators has been to dramatically increase the amount paid to free captive ships and to extend the time mariners are held in captivity.

Julian Bauer (photo), a German national now living in the Karen district of Nairobi, purportedly runs an German registered NGO called Ecoterra. Despite his focus on protecting mariners and the sea, Bauer, according to two people who used to work with him, has helped pirates increase the size of ransoms and delay their freedom by researching ship owners, determine worth of cargo and even facilitated the flow of information to drive ransoms up, not downward. These eyewitnesses have provided Somalia Report with bank information and incidents where Bauer worked with kidnappers to their benefit.

He has also been in contact with pirates on the MV Iceberg urging them to take samples from rusting cylinders to prove that there are toxic chemicals inside. The cylinders are carrying clearly marked solvents and the pirates are not about to risk getting blown up or poisoned by proving what is already on the manifest. This is just one of many examples provided to Somalia Report on outsiders meddling in current hostage negotiations for their own benefit.

One of Bauer's associates told Somalia Report, "Bauer has established a relationship based on sympathy and it gives him access to pirates. Before the negotiation is pursued, the negotiator often contacts him and gives him all the details of the ship in exchange of getting information inaccessible to the pirates without internet. Bauer also contacts the families of the hostages and becomes the Nairobi hub that facilitates the connections."

"Secondly, he tries to step into the opening dialogue while acting that he cares for the hostages and this is how he safeguards his reputation with both sides (the company and pirates). He gives the pirates the information that gives publicity for their demands and to the pirates he gives them negotiating points," added the former associate.

Bauer's contacts reportedly include the notorious pirates, Yousuf and Loyaan. His former associate continues, "He used to pay some of his pirate negotiators like “Yousuf” by using the name “Farhiya Ali” as the sender name and he had a friend too in Dahabshiil's (money transfer) office in Nairobi with the name “Mohammed”. The same source also supplied Somalia Report with evidence of financial transfers made by a Kenyan university student and Bauer's banking information.

The ships Bauer is alledged to have been involved with are the MV Win Far 161 used in the Maersk Alabama hijacking. In the case of the North Korean-flagged MV RIM Bauer is said to have contacted the pirates and was said to have told the pirates that there were missiles from North Korea hidden in the clay. This drove the ransom up to $3 million for a ship that was about to scrapped. The ship left from Eritrea en route to Yemen. After being kidnapped the Syrian crew overpowered the pirates until foreign naval ships came to their aid. The ship was considered scrap and no weapons were found.

He also provided research on the South Korean-owned MV Samho Dream to the pirates. The Very Large Crude Carrier was ransomed for an unheard of $9.5 million dollars.

According to the same source, Bauer convinced pirates to keep four Thai nationals from the Prantalay 14 with promises that he could hammer out a ransom deal from the Thai embassy. Pirates demanded an ambitious $9 million for each of the four fleet fishing vessels until they were rescued by the Indian Navy.

Bauer is alledged to have been involved with the kidnap of the Danish family from the SV Ing and is instrumental in providing advice on the $6 million ransom. The family and crew were sailing a pleasure yacht. According to two people Somalia Report interviewed who worked with Bauer claim that he negotiated ransoms while running a fraudulent charity that purports to defend the rights of mariners. One of those sources insists that Bauer has collected the proceeds of negotiation money and had it sent to his German bank account. Bauer still intermittently publishes a piracy report that lists the status of vessels and their hostages.

Not to be outdone, Somalia Report was a witness to a call Ballarin made to US ex-military entities demanding that she handle the ransom payments in the case of the kidnapped UK couple, the Chandlers, in exchange for exclusive PR rights. Her demand that she alone hand over the ransom to the former Special Forces officer queered the deal. None of these people have been arrested or charged as in the case of Shibin but they have materially aided pirates. Just like the efforts of professional hostage negotiators, which they are not, both Bauer and Ballarin have allegedly extended innocent mariners time in captivity and increased the size of ransoms paid to criminals. It must also be remembered that many individuals have intervened as negotiators due to concern for the welfare of the hostages and in the lack of any formal framework, ransom amount or understanding of the criminality of aiding and abetting pirates. Something the recent harsh sentencing of Shihin by the U.S. government has made crystal clear.

In the early years of piracy it was quite common for pirates to appeal to anyone to find a go-between to negotiate the release of a ship. It wasn't until around 2009 that a new breed of professional Somali negotiators became well known to the maritime security industry. Correspondingly a small crew of negotiators has sprung up on the ransom payment side who, despite their training have only managed to extend hostage incarceration time and increase ransoms.

Keytun

To understand the most basic form of negotiator Somalia Report contacted the “unarmed pirates”. These negotiators and ransom hagglers have two duties to perform: the first is to break the language barrier between vessel owner or captives and the pirates while the second is playing the role of an accountant during sharing of ransom payments among the pirates.

Somalia Report spoke to Tima-adde Keytun, a US national of Somali origin, who is now serving as a negotiator in the Garaad coastal area. “These unarmed men (interpreters from the diaspora) are just like armed pirates. The play a crucial role in ransom payment process, so they are very important men as far as piracy is involved," said a local villager in Garaad town, where Keytun is now based.

Keytun confirmed to Somalia Report that he relocated from the US to Gaaraad to serve as a negotiator. He left his Jewish wife in the US but his family knows nothing about her, he added.

Since his arrival in the area, he has boarded several ships to negotiate between the captives and their captures. Negotiators are always paid after the ransom is paid to pirates holding vessels or individuals.

“Being an interpreter is not the problem (with piracy) so I don’t understand why people like pointing their finger at me. I am not a pirate," said Keytun in an English with an American accent. But to the locals in Garaad, Keytun is no better than other pirates, the only difference being he is unarmed.

Keytun, however, says he is not alone in this trade of unarmed piracy. He says there are other Somalis who are in possession of North American passports who works with Somali pirates in the field. According to Keytun, these men are based in UAE and some countries in East Africa to coordinate the movements of vessels and their scheduled time to arrive in the coast of Somalia.

Khalid

UK-born Khalid, a British national of French mother, joined the negotiator trade in 2009 only to be killed last year. He knew nothing about his Somali when he arrived in the country six years ago to understand his ancestral way of life and to study Islam.

After staying in Garaad for several years, Khalid found a new method of getting money, interpreting between Somali pirates and their captives.

Khalid was first injured in a fight between two pirate groups and was later killed in another shootout between his pirate group and Puntland’s anti-piracy forces in Galkayo. His fellow pirates later attacked the Puntland police station, kidnapped the soldier they accused of killing Khalid and executed him.

Looyan

Looyan, Pirate Negotiator

At the top of the negotiator food chain sits Abdi Saed Bafe Looyan (Loyaan or Looyaan, photo), the next negotiator after Shibin to be put on the international hit list. Although the UN dedicates seven pages to him in their July 2011 report and relied on a crude police sketch, Looyan is quite easy to find. He lives with his wife and two children in Garowe and when needed travels to the coastal areas to negotiate ransoms. Currently Looyan is in Galkayo with $500,000 from the estimated $9m ransom of the MT Enrico Ilevo.

Looyan is easily reachable using any one of his 20 different SIM cards, he is quite proud of what he does and he has wisely put his money into investments outside the country. His financial assets include a family run business operating several heavy trucks operating in Zambia. Somalia Report has identified at least two homes in Garowe and one in Galkayo. After skimming or earning a 5 to 10% fee from over two dozen hijacks, Looyan has done well for his investors and himself.

He was born in Garowe in 1979. Looyan finished his primary and intermediary education there. He lived in Dubai for two years between 1992 and 1994 to complete his secondary education. He speaks English, Arabic, Urdu and Somali. Between 2001 and 2003 he worked with Jubba Airways in Bosaso as their office manager. Between 2005 and 2007, he was the project manager of a local women’s NGO in Garowe, managing USAID funds allocated to a variety of projects through the partnership of CARE International. After a spell of unemployment he decided to use his English skills to get into the business of negotiating. Looyan started out working for an Eyl based pirate group that included, Abshir “Boyah (in Bososo Prision Abdulkadir Musse Hirsi Nur (arrested in 2010) aka “Computer”, Hobyo and Haradheere-based Abdullahi-based Ahmed Haji Farah aka ‘Abdi Yare’ or Small Abdi as well as “Abdiqadir the son of ‘Afweyne’ and Garaad”. He currently is doing more business with the Galmadug based gangs.

Looyan has worked as a negotiator on about two-dozen ships. At least six of those investor Abdi Yare and the bulk with his cousin Garaad.

His cousin Mohamed Abdi, aka “Garaad”, is the very same fellow who launched the team that grabbed the Maersk Alabama and many other ships. Prior to his career in piracy, Garaad was a member of the UK HART Security trained Puntland Coast Guard stood up in 1998 and shut down in 2000. Western expertise absorbed by enterprising Somali criminals seems to be a key part of the pirates success.

It was during the MV Olib G hijack that Looyan (via Garaad) reneged on an agreement just 48 hours before the vessel was due to be released. This resulted in higher ransom payment.

MV Blida
EU NAVFOR
MV Blida

Despite Looyan’s newly found fame amongst the UN and law enforcement as the “top” negotiator, his star may be on the descent. In October of 2011 Looyan was brought in by Garaad after “Ali” was fired on the MV Blida ransom negotiation. The owner of the ship was the Algerian government and the ransom was stuck at the hull insurance level of just over $2 million. “Ali” the first negotiator could not get the owners to budge and signed a contract with the owner of the MV Blida specifying the drop time. At the last minute Ali was fired and Looyan cancelled the deal just as the owner had started the drop and refuel mission. Often the ransom drop and refit/refuel can coast up to $200,000.

Looyan tried a number of his tricks but could not get the ransom up the $4.5 million that Garaad demanded. Looyan had struck out. The deal was made at the original hull insurance price and Looyan was determined to get his reputation back. Before he left the Blida, the one eyed Looyan posed with the ransom payment (photo). Thereby cementing his fate as a conspirator in the business of kidnapping and piracy.

When Garaad called Looyan to negotiate the MT Enrico Ievoli he pulled out all the stops. Looyan used his trick of moving hostages onto land to force owners into speeding up negotiations. The owners settled for an unusually high ransom but it was concluded in four months. Publicly pirates boasted that the ransom was $9 million, realistically it would be around $5 million. Owner Domenico Levoli says no ransom was paid. Puntland police did arrest ten of the pirates including some investors on their way to the ship, but the money being spent and bragged about in Galkayo tells a different story.

If and when Looyan is arrested there will be a long line of takers for his lucrative job. Looyan is just one of about a dozen Somali pirate negotiators currently working on ships inside Somalia. Some are based in Europe, some in the UAE and most are based in the Horn of Africa. A few like Looyan still make the trek to each ship to personally handle the sat phone conversations, dealing with sick crewmembers and filming propaganda videos to encourage faster payment.

Looyan's Negotiated Ransoms

He prides himself on his tricks of the trade after successfully negotiating over 20 ships with ever increasing ransom prices.

1. MV Longchamp (29 Jan 2009-28 Mar 2009)

2. MV Malaspina Castle (06 Apr 2009-09 May 2009)

3. MV Win Far 161 (06 Apr 2009-11 Feb 2010)

4. MV Patriot (25 Apr 2009-22 May 2009)

5. MV Ariana (02 May 2009-10 Dec 2009)

6. MV Victoria (05 May 2009-18 Jul 2009) 7. MV Navios Apollon (28 Dec 2009-28 Feb 2010)

8. MV St James Park (28 Dec 2009-04 May 2010)

9. MV Asian Glory (01 Jan 2010-11 Jun 2010)

10. MV Al Nisr Al Saudi (03 Mar 2010-07 Dec 2010)

11. MV Frigia (23 Mar 2010-29 Jul 2010)

12. MV Samho Dream (04 Apr 2010-06 Nov 2010)

13. MV Marida Marguerite (08 May 2010-28 Dec 2010)

14. MV Panega (11 May 2010-09 Sep 2010)

15. MV Polar (30 Oct 2010- 26 Aug 2011)

16. MV Hannibal II (11 Nov 2010-17 Mar 2011)

17. MV Jahan Moni (05 Dec 2010-14 Mar 2011)

18. MV Thor Nexus (25 Dec 2010-12 Apr 2011)

19. MV Sinin (12 Feb 2011-14 Aug 2011)

20. MV Irene SL (09 Feb 2011-08 Apr 2011)

21 MV Blida (1 Jan, 2011 - 03 Nov, 2011)

22 Enrico Ievoli (27 Dec 2011 – 23 April 2012)

Breaking News
Somaliland Aggressively Countering Corruption Charges
By JD 03/17/2012
Current Disputed boundaries
Current Disputed boundaries
Police from Somalia’s breakaway state of Somaliland detained two officials from the city council of Borame in the Awdal region on Saturday, according to Somaliland officials.

Hassan Halas Barre, a member of parliament (MP) and Mohamoud Hassan Omar, an engineer sitting on Borame council, were detained by Somalialand police. Other officials, including MPs and the secretary of Borame's city council, have charges against them but have yet to be arrested. All were accused of corruption related to taxes.

Somaliland General Auditor Mohamoud Aw-abdi confirmed the detentions to Somalia Report, but would not offer details, saying, “Yes, the MP and Mohamoud Hassan Omar were arrested by police. We are in the process of investigating these charges and won't give you more information now, we will explain the charges later,” the General Auditor said.

Somalia Report contacted police officers in Borame who were not allowed to make direct comments, but were able to speak with Borame council member Mohamoud Hassan Omar while in detention. “I am currently being held in the Borame police station. The police arrested me and MP Hassan Halas Barre, and they are also looking for another MP and the council secretary. They accused us of corruption. I called General Auditor Mohamoud Aw-Abdi, and he told me that they will release us soon. I was an engineer for the council, and my duty was to work on construction methods. I did not take money or payments, that was not my job,” Mohamoud Hassan Omar told Somalia Report.

These officials have been accused of squandering money taken in taxes from Borame. Somaliland is attempting to control the spending of local administrations, including councils from different cities and regions. The government of Somaliland seems determined to send a massage about corruption to Somaliland officials.

Delay in Court Hearing for Former Official

There has been a delay in the case of the former governor of Maroodi Jeex region, Ahmed Omar Haji, ex-director of minister for resettlement Ahmed Elmi Barre and former advisor of Somaliland’s vise president. They were arrested a week before and charged with corruption related to theft of food aid intended for drought victims.

Dozens of family members and supporters of the accused officials gathered in front of Hargeisa's courtroom on Saturday, before court officials announced at noon that the trial of these three former officials was delayed.

UPDATE
Operations Resume for 4 NGOs Accused of Corruption
By SHIINE OMAR, ASSIA SHIDANE 03/14/2012
Galmudug President Mohamed Alin
© Galmudug website - galmudug.com
Galmudug President Mohamed Alin

The President and senior officials of the semi autonomous state of Galmudug have lifted a ban that was imposed on four Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) three days ago. The four agencies were banned by Galmudug’s Minister for Health Abdullahi Hassan Mohamed who accused the agencies of corruption. They are currently authorised to resume operations in Galmudug area.

Hassan Mohamud Hail, Galmudug’s Parliamentary speaker told Somalia Report on Tuesday evening that the Galmudug administration allowed them to resume operations as discussions on how to solve some of the raised issues are initiated by the Galmudug President, Mohamed Alin. The previous decision to ban the agencies from Galmudug was made without sufficient consultations with other officials and ministries of the region.

World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), Relief International (RI) and Somaliland Family Health Association (SOFHA) have now resumed operations in the area.

“We realized that the Minister for Health made a hasty decision in banning these NGO’s. There has been some misunderstanding between these agencies and the Minister and the issues will be resolved after further discussions. These organizations have been operating for sometime in the area and can provide better services to the people of Galmudug. We will discuss these issues with the concerned entities,” said Hassan Mohamud Hail.

During a telephone conversation with the President Mohamed Alin this morning, he explained that the prior decision to ban the agencies was hasty and made without consultation with his office. President Alin conceded that issues of management and the need for establishment of better communication channels between the agencies and Galmudug’s administration needed to be resolved for the expansion of health and development programmes by these agencies. Currently, these agencies are based in Puntland where their operations are planned and monitored from. The Galmudug administration prefers that they establish a separate office in Galmudug and involve the local administration in development planning and implementation.

“The immunization program has been ongoing for years and is overseen by WHO staff and officials who are based in Puntland. We would prefer that they establish a fully fledged office in Galmudug where they can continue to serve needy populations in liaison with the local administration. We shall discuss these issues with the agencies and work towards serving the population better,” said President Alin.

The president who is currently in Nairobi intends to return to Galkayo where he will initiate discussions with the development agencies.

“We all seek what is best for our people. Am sure that the agencies will be willing to work towards solutions that ensure better humanitarian and health services provision for the people of Galmudug,” he added.

Mohiyadin Mohamed, a resident of Galkayo expressed his relief at the news that the four NGO’s would resume operations in Galmudug area.

“The decision to allow NGO’s to do their work is a good one and I am pleased by it. They will help more people in the region and I advise the government to ensure that they implement required projects. The government must take the responsibility of ensuring their security,” said Mohiyadin Mohamed.

None of the agencies have commented on the developments so far.

Exclusive
Part II: Of Budgets and Briefcase Ministries
By JAY BAHADUR 02/27/2012

Welcome to Part II of Somalia Report's three-part series exposing financial corruption and mismanagement within the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The findings presented here are sourced from a recently issued report, Audit Investigative Report-2011, by the former head of the TFG's Public Finance Management Unit, Abdirazak Fartaag.

In Part I, Somalia Report revealed how the Somali Central Bank operates as a virtual ATM for TFG ministries, issuing unaccounted for cash withdrawals in amounts as high as $800,000.

In Part II, we take a look at the TFG’s makeshift annual budget, its revenue shortfalls, and its "briefcase ministries."

One of the main themes of Abdirazak Fartaag’s report is the Somali government’s woeful inefficiency at collecting its own revenue, relying on international donors to fund 70% of its annual budget (see below).

© Abdirazak Fartaag

At the beginning of 2011, the TFG presented its preliminary budget, which laid out its expected revenues and expenditures for the year.

TFG preliminary budget January-June
© Abdirazak Fartaag
TFG preliminary budget January-June

TFG preliminary budget July-December
© Abdirazak Fartaag
TFG preliminary budget July-December

Over the first six months of the year, Fartaag’s audit reveals, revenue collection fell almost $18 million short of the predicted $49 million. From July to December, $23 million short. In total, the TFG’s actual revenue stood at $58 million, almost $42 million less than the amount predicted going into 2011.

A large proportion of this shortfall was due to the $26 million in bilateral aid from the United Arab Emirates and Sudanese governments that simply disappeared, as detailed in Part I.

Another pipe draining the bucket was the gap in expected taxes collected through Mogadishu port and Aden Adde international airport, which represents virtually all of the domestic revenue generated by the TFG. While the preliminary budget predicted $27 million in port and airport revenue, the final amount raised over the course of 2011 stood at just $17 million (oddly, although the preliminary budget categorizes port/airport taxes as “tax revenue,” in subsequent records the revenue is tabulated as “non-tax revenue”). Fartaag suspects that much of the tax revenue levied at Mogadishu’s port and airport failed to reach the Central Bank of Somalia, though his report supplies no proof in this regard. But the TFG's own internal records indicate that at least some of the money was miscounted, as evidenced by an internal audit of port and airport revenue (see below left).

Port revenues and police audit, January to June 2011
Port revenues and police audit, January to June 2011

While Ministry of Finance and Somali Central Bank accounting records $12.6 million in taxes collected from January to June, an independent police audit shows $8.4 million raised over the same period. As far as Somalia Report is aware, no internal inquiry has been undertaken to address the $4.2 million discrepancy between the two accounts.

Stranger still is the fact that the audit was conducted by a police agency and not, say, the Auditor General. Interestingly, the police audit includes a stream of revenue entirely omitted from the Central Bank/Ministry of Finance tally: $30,485 collected from the Mogadishu's KM50 airport. Given that the airport was located squarely in Shabaabistan until the Islamist group’s August withdrawal from the capital, precisely how the facility managed to generate income for the TFG is somewhat of a mystery.

One possible (if speculative) explanation may lie in the fact that KM50 is reportedly administered by a private interest based in Nairobi, which operated the facility under al-Shabaab and continues to do so under the TFG administration.

The same party allegedly pays SoSh 1 billion (approximately $30,000) per month to the TFG for the rights to collect revenue, according to information provided to Somalia Report. This kickback, not surprisingly, does not show up in the police audit.

Although Fartaag supplies no hard evidence of the misappropriation of port revenues, a quick comparison with two of Somalia’s other major ports suggests that the Mogadishu facility generates far less than its potential.

Bosaso port, which does not even possess Mogadishu’s deep water capability, generates nearly all of the Puntland government’s annual revenue (typically between $15-$20 million). Somaliland’s Berbera deep water port reportedly earns around twice that figure.

That Mogadishu’s port managed to raise tax revenues of only $17 million in 2011 should raise more than a few suspicions.

Port/airport revenue July-December
© Abdirazak Fartaag
Port/airport revenue July-December

Perhaps as a result of the budgetary shortfall, civil servant salaries were not paid for the last three months of 2011—which is somewhat understandable, since bureaucrat salaries are not so much as earmarked in the budget.

Although the TFG has come along since President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed's cronies reputedly scrawled out Somalia’s 2009 budget on the back of a luxury hotel napkin, the 2011 version is not yet quite up to international specs.

The TFG's "Secret" Military Budget

A major omission in both the TFG budget as well as in Fartaag’s audit is the Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) account, a procurement and management fund set up to manage US monetary aid to Somalia. $25 million has passed through the fund since its inception in June 2009, according to a source close to the government.

The PwC fund represents Somalia’s military budget, paying the $100 per month salaries of the approximately 7,000 militiamen on the TFG payroll, as well as funding pro-government Radio Mogadishu, Somalia TV, and capacity training for the Ministry of Finance.

The operation, as Somalia Report has detailed in depth, is not a smooth one; after each pay cycle the payroll is revised and updated, an arduous process, and salaries are routinely paid months late.

It is perhaps understandable that the preliminary TFG budget would ignore the PwC fund, as the money is not managed through the Central Bank and TFG ministries.

Why, then, is $18.7 million in multilateral aid included in the preliminary budget?

Fartaag assumes in his report (perhaps incorrectly) that the money represents funding for the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) police training initiative, primarily paid for by the Japanese, although according to Somalia Report’s own reporting only $10 million was donated by the Japanese government in 2011 to cover police training.

If at least over half of multilateral assistance consists of UNDP—and thus is distributed through UN channels, not Somali government institutions—then it is conspicuously inconsistent that the preliminary budget would include this item yet omit the PwC purse.

Briefcase Ministries

TFG ministries, as Fartaag's report portrays them, barely generate any revenues, provide virtually no services, and collect transfer payments through a seemingly random pattern of cash handouts paid to individuals, as detailed in Part I of this series.

“Every one of our ministers is a briefcase minister,” Fartaag told Somalia Report. “They exist to collect their per diems and then go stay in the best hotels in Nairobi.”

“Then they play to the international galleries, saying ‘We can’t do anything because the international community isn’t doing its job.’”

Herein lies an obvious criticism of Fartaag’s report, namely his expectation of TFG ministries to have delivered services back when their employees were more occupied with dodging al-Shabaab mortars during the better part of their waking hours.

For most of last year, TFG ministers were more concerned about being pushed into the sea by the Islamist group—then in control of most of the capital—than about providing pregnancy screenings or free textbooks. How were ministries supposed to collect revenue, let alone provide services, under these circumstances?

To their credit, TFG ministries are attempting to fill in some of the space left by the retreating militants. Drawing on $1.8 million earmarked by the Danish government, the TFG has plans to reoccupy and refurbish five buildings previously owned by the former Somali government, including three hospitals. Though the money has not yet been spent, forced mass evictions have already been carried out in preparation, leaving hundreds of families homeless, some of whom had been living in the abandoned buildings for decades.

But given that a total of just over $1 million was spent on providing social services in 2011 (see below), it takes a healthy dose of optimism to envision how the Ministry of Health will be able to staff and fund the operation of even three hospitals once the modest Danish seed money is expended.

A quick glance at budget expenditures reveals how little was available for provision of services. Administrative costs—salaries, travel, office supplies—made up by far the largest drain on the TFG budget, over $46 million ($23,646,838 from January to June; $22,278,003 from July-December) out of the total budget of around $58 million.

That’s a lot of pen and pencils.

By contrast, social services—encompassing the ministries of education, health, and women’s services—received a total allocation of $1.07 million over the course of the year (and government records do not reveal what even this negligible sum was spent on).

Expenditure on social services, January to June 2011
© Abdirazak Fartaag
Expenditure on social services, January to June 2011

Expenditure on social services, July to December 2011
© Abdirazak Fartaag
Expenditure on social services, July to December 2011

According to information obtained by Somalia Report, each ministry is supposed to be allocated a boilerplate monthly transfer payment of $12,000 to cover salaries and expenses. Beyond this, additional funds are dispersed on an arbitrary, case-by-case basis, handed over in cash to sundry clerks sent with letters signed by the prime minister, finance minister, or other high ranking officials.

In January, for instance, the Ministry of Education received $2,000 in cash handovers from the Central Bank. In March, $33,348. Why the ministry's expenditures would vary by over a factor of 15 from month to month is not explained through any official policy.

Requests for comment from the TFG prime minister and finance minister have not been returned.

Start Small

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that only about one in five school age children in Somalia receive primary schooling, with education exclusively provided by NGOs and religious organizations.

While it is not practical in the near future for the Ministry of Education to construct, fund, and staff state-owned schools, financing the the expansion of NGO-administered schools would be a quick and simple way for the TFG to begin performing the semblance of the functions of a national government.

Of course, funding would necessitate raising revenues, far more than the $13,440 collected by the ministry over the course of the entire year. Sources of potential revenue collection will be addressed in Part III of this series, to follow.

If the ultimate goal is to sell the concept of democracy and good central government to the Somali people (the UN roadmap on ending the transition speaks, with blithely naïve optimism, of possibly holding direct elections within a four year time frame), then holding the TFG responsible for providing some kind of services—in Mogadishu, at the very least—to its supposed constituents might be a good first step towards establishing its legitimacy.

“We’re given money to build schools, hospitals. Who is stopping us from building them?” Fartaag told Somalia Report. “Why can’t we revamp our airport? Just look at it!”

The Somali people might well be asking the same questions.

For the full audit report, please click here: Audit_Investigative_Report___2011_Consolidatedx.pdf

Note: Abdirazak Fartaag is funded by various relatives living in Kenya and the United States, who have requested that their anonymity be preserved.

Feature
Part I: The Cash Kleptocracy
By JAY BAHADUR 02/21/2012
 Abdirazak Fartaag presenting at the Grand Regency, Nairobi
© Somalia Report, all rights reserved
Abdirazak Fartaag presenting at the Grand Regency, Nairobi

In the lead up to the London Conference on Somalia, Somalia Report will be publishing a three-part series on alledged financial corruption and mismanagement within the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

The findings presented here are sourced from a recently issued report, Audit Investigative Report-2011, by former TFG financial officer Abdirazak Fartaag.

With the release of this controversial private report, Fartaag issues his third straight annual look at TFG finances.

From April 2009 until April 2011, he served as the head of a newly created Public Finance Management Unit (PFMU) under former TFG prime ministers Mohamed Farmajo and Abdirashid Shermarke. Shermarke resigned on September 21, 2010 after disagreements with President Sharif. Fartaag was fired shortly thereafter in January of 2011.

This third report is privately funded and not related to the TFG.

In June 2011 Fartaag released an audit showing exactly where $300 million had gone under the the TFG. Although many Somalis insisted their government was not completely honest, it was Prime Minister Sharmarke who created the PFMU to track the $20 million in funds collected by the TFG and figure out where they went. In 2010, Fartaag did the first internal audit in twenty years. What he found was disturbing.

In 2009 the TFG collected about $8.2 million from taxes and $11 million from foreign donors. After investigating what he thought were simple cash input and outputs, Fartaag realized that the major amount of money collected by the TFG was almost ten times higher when foreign donor funds are included.

Fartaag's original report caused a sensation but not much change. A ten man anti-corruption committee was created in January of 2012 but little has been heard from them. Somalia's reputation as the "most corrupt" nation was also bolstered in the most recent Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. None of these organizations, including the TFG, have provided anything close to the detailed documents gathered by Fartaag upon which he makes his case.

After Fartaag left government, he became a whistle blower and continues to use internal documents to publish his latest report that shows a temporary Somali government without any fiscal restraint or oversight. His official PFMU 2009-2010 document revealed a government with access to not just only $8 million in taxes and $11 million in UN funds but $300 million dollars once donor funds were included.

His conclusions back then were:

i. Gross public financial mismanagement;

ii. Large scale misappropriation of public funds;

iii. Large scale misappropriations of donor funds (Arabian);

iv. Unethical and unacceptable professional negligence;

v. Financial intimidation at the Executive’s office compromising transparent and accountability;

vi. Concealment (under) collection of government budget revenue receipts;

vii. Concealment (under) payment of outstanding government expenditure receipts

That was a year ago and he continues to audit the TFG and present his results. As a private individual and he puts blame squarely with Somalia, not the donors. On Saturday, Fartaag presented the report card to an audience of Somali stakeholders and politicians at Nairobi’s Grand Regency Hotel. Although the conference hall was filled to capacity, few Somali politicians were in attendance.

“I met with a Somali MP (Member of Parliament) the day before the presentation,” Fartaag said with a sly grin. “He asked me if my allegations implicated the Minister of Finance. I told him ‘yes,’ and he didn’t show up to the presentation the next day. This shows that loyalties still lie with individuals, not the government.”

“Fartaag,” he explained to me, is a nickname handed down from his father, meaning “one who raises his finger.” To judge from his animated gesticulating at the podium, it is a sobriquet he has not merely inherited, but earned for himself.

The presentation was in Somali using a number of financial tables of numbers projected on the screen behind him. Although the content of his slides were just numbers, he had the audience hanging on his words.

Fartaag’s 50-plus page audit painted a picture of corruption, malfeasance, and outright theft facilitated by an out of control temporary government funded almost entirely of unmonitored cash transactions.

In fairness, Somalia does not have traditional banking or accounting institutions. Troops, civil employees and contractors must be paid in cash, by halwallas or money transfer firms like Dahabshiil. The last time he made similar accusations, the TFG reacted angrily pointing out Fartaag's numbers were not derived from an official audit and presented with no attempt to work with the TFG's auditor general.

A Government That Runs on Cash

Fartaag makes the accusation that the Somali Central Bank, the repository for all TFG revenues and most international financial assistance, exists as a de facto personal bank account for the TFG’s top executives.

“There is no accountability, no rules at all,” Fartaag explained to Somalia Report over coffee following his presentation. “Civil servants aren’t paid ‘salaries,’ they’re given ‘allowances,’ which are not paid with any regularity. What happens is that once a civil servant hasn’t been paid for a while, he goes to the PM or President—whomever he has personal connections to—who will then write him a letter asking the Central Bank to pay him X amount of dollars.”

“80% of the budget is paid out in this way—transfers of cash to individuals,” he explained.

In other words, $37 million of a total of $45 million spent on ministerial salaries and administrative expenses (by far the largest item in the TFG budget) were dispersed to gofers sent on behalf of various ministries, often without the authorizing officer properly identified. Records to which Somalia Report was granted access showed withdrawals as high as $800,000 in cash being handed over to individual recipients.

In one month, over $750,000 was paid to employees at the Office of the President alone.

Cash payments handed out to individuals, January-June 2011
Cash payments handed out to individuals, January-June 2011

Cash payments handed out to individuals, July-December 2011
Cash payments handed out to individuals, July-December 2011

As for what happens to the money after it’s withdrawn, let’s just say that the TFG’s accounting safeguards are about as sophisticated as what one would find on the average ATM machine: astonishingly, no systematic records ore kept of how the money is spent.

Donor Cash

And that's just the cash that actually makes it into the Central Bank coffers. The TFG receives bilateral assistance from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of around $5 million per month, in cash. Every month, TFG officials fly to the UAE, where they are literally handed $5 million in a suitcase. Where the money goes from there is unclear.

Only two months in 2011 show Central Bank deposits for the full $5 million. In January, UAE deposits totaled just over $1.5 million. In October, only $130,045. Whether a remnant moral compunction or outright shame compelled this piddling concession to financial propriety is a question not answered by the records.

In total, of the $60 million donated by the UAE to the Somali government, only $34 million is accounted for in Central Bank records.

The government of Sudan has also reportedly pledged the TFG $1 million per month, piped directly into the office of the president. Only one deposit of $800,000, registered on April 9, appears in Central Bank records.

What appears to be systematic, monthly looting may also be trumped by one-time opportunistic thievery. Such was the case during the Salama Fikira incident, in which six private security contractors were arrested in Mogadishu's Aden Adde airport on May 24, 2011, while en route to do a pirate ransom drop.

The $3.6 million in ransom money was subsequently confiscated, and while Central Bank records show that a signed banking slip for the deposit was issued, the cash mysteriously disappeared somewhere along the way from the teller window to the vaults. ($3.6 million wasn't quite adequate, apparently, and Salama Fikira was extorted for a $100,000 "fine" to spring their employees from 15-year sentences in Somali prison).

Requests for comment from the TFG Prime Minister and Finance Minister were not immediately answered.

Joint Financial Management Board

One of the stated purposes of the upcoming London Conference on Somalia, which takes place on Thursday, is to deliver "a new international approach to Somalia."

Over the last year, the "two Sharifs," TFG President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, and parliament speaker Sharif Hassan, have been able to run roughshod over the UN and its special representative to Somalia, Augustine Mahiga. In August of last year the two Sharifs hijacked the "transition" by jetting off to Uganda and unilaterally extending their terms in office for one year, establishing a two-headed rulership under what became known as the Kampala Accord. The Kampala Accord has led to the Garowe meetings that have forged a caretaker, but semi-permanent Somali government. This disregard for democratic and rule of law seems to be reflected in the handling of what should be public not private funds.

Fartaag is hopeful that a proposed caretaker system called the "Joint Financial Management Board" will help.

"I think this report is going to make a big difference in London," he said. "The British are out to help Somali citizens by improving transparency and accountability."

"This is information they cannot get anywhere else."

The Joint Financial Management Board proposed by the British will begin operating after the national elections scheduled for August. So far, however, the Board is not much more than a bullet point on the conference agenda.

When asked the motivation behind his potentially dangerous challenge to Somalia's entrenched political kleptocracy, Fartaag was quick to answer.

"Somalis from the diaspora only want to talk about how the international community has got things wrong in Somalia," he said. "This is my main point: the problem doesn't lie with the international community at all. It's us."

TO BE CONTINUED

In Part II of Jay Bahadur's exclusive report: Briefcase Ministries, Somalia Report will take an in depth look at the TFG’s ministries-in-name only.