The fall of Afgoye and the coming final showdown in Kismayo may allow westerners to become optimistic about the prospects of a free and stable Somalia. Much like the fall of the Taliban it appears that al-Shabaab is tightening their flip-flops and fleeing rather than fighting. In time the lack of funds and safe havens will reduce the wahabists to a few cranky jihadis and a few foreign volunteers who by their own unfortunate career choice, will have to go out with a bang.

Al Shabaab was often described as a Hawiye clan based group with "several thousand fighters" augmented by an ever changing complement of foreign jihadis and ethnic Somali's with foreign passports. Although the most misty eyed jihadi may have seen Somalia as Afghanistan in the 90's, western style governance is catching on. Yemen, Mali, Afghanistan and even Syria have more appeal these days to foreign fighters. Many of those have returned via the charcoal and fishing dhows that ply the coast. It must remembered that al Shabaab's slogan is “The Army of Hardship in Somalia.” which they are delivering on.

Running Away to Fight Another Day?

Retreating used to be called 'fleeing' in the face of a stronger opponent now al-Shabaab calls it called 'strategic withdrawal'. Their sources of income like Bakara and soon Kismayo will dry up. Even their lusty squandering of ordnance will have to rely on avarice of unpaid TFG soldiers as airfields are taken and roads checkpointed.

Al-Shabaab is fleeing. But to where? There is no Pakistan, no Syria, no safe haven just across the border. They can go underground and wait but al-Shabaab's only hope is that the west will pull another Afghanistan and turn a victory into failure. It is much more expedient to yell fire in a crowded theater versus creating a national security apparatus that would prevent anyone from yelling fire in all theaters. Al Shabaab can continue to toss grenades, vaporize themselves and make videos with inoperative MANPADs. But my personal guess is that Somali's will get very tired of that behavior.

Afghanistan was different - ten years of chaos followed by a short partial rule of the taliban, followed by an even shorter foreign victory followed by a long insurgency. Somalia had no functioning government to overthrow, no inherent spoils to fight over and no neighbor like Pakistan to succor and recognize the victor. Somalia is simply running out of reasons to war. Disputes and flareups yes. But unless the new government is as corrupt and incompetent as the Karzai one in Afghanistan and the natural mechanisms are defeated by outside "modernization" Somalia may actually stumble into peace.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) remains an attractive enemy with foreign paid, kitted and trained soldiers manning fixed positions and lumbering around in giant armored vehicles. If AMISOM stays Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo may look like Baghdad. If Somalis choose to root out violence it may suddenly shift from war to peace. Various groups will be eyeing control of the markets, ports, highways and sources of income but it won't be al-Shabaab. Another new arrived group of diaspora, refugees and recently installed politicians will also be eying the swollen checkbooks and good intentions of foreign aid bringers. There will be squabbles over development money and massive abuse. Kindness can kill.

Victory has been the result of slow plodding bravery, phenomenal amounts of free ammunition and endless political wangling. No where has anyone actually addressed the underlying roots of the salafists, their ultimate role in government and just how much the US will meddle in Somali politics going forward. The taliban is angling for some type of political control but only after the removal of what they consider to be a puppet ruler. It will be interesting to watch how politics will evolve in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Garowe, Galkayo and Hargeisa. Event the most adventurous bookie would not take bets on who will be in charge one year from now.

The war is not over, Afgoye is not Mogadishu and Kismayo will not be the final battle but there is now a steady drumbeat of defeat being played out by the US, EU and their weapon of choice, AMISOM. Credit should be given to the Ugandans who have moved from bush fighters to urban rumblers and back to bush fighters with little glory. Over 4600 Kenyans and Ras Kamboni fighters in the south didn't hurt either not to mention a few thousand Ethiopians and ASWJ proxies that hover around the central border. In all a uneven mix of neighbors, mercenaries, militias and under/unpaid local recruits have turned al-Shabaab from an insurgent group to sporadic spoilers.

The Ugandan, Kenyan, Burundian interest in risking the deaths of their soldiers for a dollar has allowed America and Europe to stay in the shadows. Dollars, not ideology, fought this war.

You don't read a lot of press releases about dead and injured. The Somali troops are the least talked about but they are taking the brunt of the beating on many offensives. Poorly paid, badly trained but loaded up with vehicles, white skinned mentors and new eastern bloc weapons they are the ones who add the weight that the conscripts of al-Shabaab fear.

The insurgents source of money and freedom of movement are being slowly erased off the map. When they flee there is no wellspring of anger or support just a sense of relief that business and life may return to what Somalis consider normal.

Yes al-Shabaab does have support but only in the way that tribal and religious politics need a yin to the yang. People pay attention when you are shooting at them. In a post-Shabaab Somalia, other more vocal, logical and possibly armed groups will spring up to represent special and regional interests but the flow of money into government will reward those who play by the rules.

Religion did not resolve disputes well in Somalia. Sharia can punish crimes, insert governance where none existed but it is only the one of the moral foundations and interpersonal expertise that can allow clans to move past flare ups and disputes. This was the weakness of al-Shabaab in Somalia. Their humorless, salafist, socialist, nickel and dime, anti-Western view of Somalia ran counter to the vibrant progressive and inclusive social system of Somalis.

While many focus on the conflict caused by clans in Somalia, there is more evidence to support the robust inter-clan dynamics and effect of the international diaspora that allows most of Somalia to function. Somalia is not about cliques but about movement, change, interpersonal actions, investment, and support between those groups. It is definitely not about killing in the name of religion. In fact the Somalis use of xeer, their traditional legal structure, is the antithesis of al-Shabaab's mindless brutality and corporal punishment. Somalis will put on a show of outrage but disputes are always brokered after the fact with the proper compensation provided and the aggressor admonished privately.

Small Country, Long Retreat

Afgoye is a short commute northwest of Mogadishu. It has been known more for a place of refuge from the fighting inside the capital since 1991. The Afgoye Corridor has been home to around 400,000 internally displaced persons (IPDs) competing with Kenya’s Dadaab camp as Somalia’s second largest city.

Like most “temporary” camps, Afgoye has been a bustling center for IDPs and a fertile recruiting, taxation and safe area for al Shabaab. It was not hard to find disgruntled or desperate recruits and supporters here.

Sheik Mohammed Abu Abdalla, the al-Shabaab appointed governor of Shabelle and the corridor, made an official announcement that AMISOM had taken the town without a fight and that the insurgent group had made a tactical withdrawal. This is the third major retreat that al-Shabaab has made with major losses in Mogadishu, Baidoa and now the critical crossroad between Mogadishu and the south.

This is the end for al-Shabaab as a military force even though they don’t know it nor do they want to admit it. There will be a battle for their heartland in Marka and Kismayo but it will only be a matter of time before they run out of oxygen and lifeblood. Al-Shabaab operates on funds donated or extorted from locals, willing and unwilling recruits from IDP camps and political legitimacy or illegitimacy depending on which part of the power curve they are on.

All the broken shards of al-Shabaab has left is the legitimate claim that foreigners are meddling in Somalia and their dubious intent on creating a salaafist style caliphate in line with the perverse ideals of al Qaeda. This kept the Taliban ticking over in Afghanistan as they regrouped in Pakistan with government blessings. There is no such haven over the border in Kenya, Ethiopia or in the north. There is Yemen, some pockets along the Kenyan coast and perhaps Pakistan, but al Shabaab doesn't have that kind of money or clout. Their fighters need to eat and a DDR will pull most of them into the Somali military infrastructure.

The initial reaction of AMISOM and NGO groups was that the military advance would now allow aid to flow into the Afgoye corridor. Al-Shabaab had routinely keept out, harassed and extorted western aid agencies as being spies, counterproductive and disruptive.

Ten Years?

Al-Shabaab is correct on one point. Creating an entrenched Western welfare system that is political in nature may be the worst thing that can happen. Al-Shabaab was vigorous in trying to move back residents out of camps and back into their homes. This was crudely handled and badly timed but the point is that Somalia will only get back on its feet when the basic units of society begin to function. Although Mogadishu was an epicenter of unrestrained violence by insurgents and AMISOM the city was never subject to the effects of drought and starvation.

The Afgoye Corridor is a mix of those fleeing either violence, drought, hunger or financial devastation. The residents should be encouraged to return home, rebuild their flocks, fields and lives. This will push aid and workers into the remote regions where al-Shabaab held sway. The five long years of al-Shabaab violence will not vanish but the groups that want to see Somalia succeed should take advantage of al-Shabaab’s diminishment and push their help into the hinterlands. In Afghanistan, uniquely western ideas linked to receiving aid and pushing out former taliban and allowing corruption made openings for the Taliban's return. In Iraq the wholesale firing of the entire military and political system created a vibrant, long lasting insurgency. It remains to be seen how well or badly the west handles Somalia's return from two decades of chaos.

There Will Be Blood

The total defeat of al-Shabaab will not be soon. They are bad losers and even worse peace negotiators. There will be the continued and ongoing murders of civilians, suicide attacks against the government, harassments against peace keepers and the comical media releases that claim victory while normal Somalis ignore them. The West will hyperventilate about the threat of terrorism (and include Yemen and al Qaeda) and continue to use Somalia as a killing ground to protect itself. The north will flare up as supplies lines to Yemen remain open.

But al-Shabaab is a bad history student. All three Somali uprisings going back to the Mad Mullah and the Dervish State have been extinguished in the Golis Mountains. Somalis have an irritating habit of going about their business despite Western agendas. The massive overpaid misery mob in Nairobi will start brushing up their resumes, not quite keen on leaving the cool green of Kenya and moving to sweltering in Galkayo, Kismayo or Mogadishu. Peace in Somalia might mean restoring their own agriculture, transportation and an eager diaspora brain trust to a level that doesn't require an army of NGOs to run their country.

At some point the three key elements of al-Shabaab must amputate their rotting limbs to maintain their own survival. Sheikh Robow will most likely perfect his ongoing deal to move to the Emirates to join his family. Aweys, who some say is privately negotiating a surrender with the TFG, may seek political legitimacy with the TFG or flee to Eritrea. Godane will most likely go down fighting in the north and the rank and file of "The Youth" will be demobbed or absorbed into what will become the less than perfect Somali military. Despite the romantic ideas of mujahadeen surviving in the bush, Somalia's wilderness is a brutal place. Al-Shabaab will always have support along the Swahili coast, but even Marka will soon be free. Perhaps they will erect a monument to al-Shabaab next to the ones erected to commemorate the Biyomaal and Ashraaf Revolt

The Next Revolution

Somalis must be allowed to defend themselves, create their own security elements and push back against the return of al Shabaab, criminals or even pirates along the coastal areas. Right now Somalis are treated like truculent children if they dont' agree with "Road Maps" "Dual Track"s or are branded as "Spoilers". This attitude must change. It cannot be said that the UN, the U.S. or Europe have shown significant success in their endeavors nor have the cut and paste government called the TFG.

Success has been seen more the results of regional leaders simply ignoring the UN and getting on with it. Somaliland is it's own country...despite UN ignoring it, Puntland has created its own anti piracy force...despite the UN trying to shut it down. Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea the UAE have all simply brushed the UN aside as they go about their foreign policy work inside Somalia. When convenient these groups and leaders can also push forward the UN agenda.

For Somalis to take charge of their destiny after Shabaab there needs to be something else for the youth and population of Somalia to turn to. The foreign-constructed government and constitution will be simply symbols, not functioning entities for quite some time. Mundane things like jobs, clean water, self interest, lack of corruption will not spring up from the ground. The population must be able to arrest corrupt policemen, oust lazy politicians and set the direction for their own region.

Sustainable growth will be slow. The fertile fields of the south, the depleted fisheries, devastated stock numbers and the transportation system are in need of repair and may be beyond salvation. The promise of oil, self interested neighbors, and a lost generation will cause conflict.

Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that massive input of funds leads directly to kleptocracies often run by minorities with direct links to unwelcome players. Spoon-fed constitutions and hand-picked politicians soon turn into tyrants and eager investors from the diaspora can quickly be discouraged by the heavy hand of bloated underpaid local agencies. Perhaps the new Somali government should take a junket to Baghdad and Kabul to see what IED-sized political potholes lay ahead.

There is much work for the international community to do within their own ranks. The 20-year-old UN Arms Embargo should be dropped, the structure and future of AMISOM should be examined. The role of the US, Europe, Turkey, UAE, Ethiopia and Kenya should be brought into sharper focus. Each has an ultimate agenda unrelated to each other and each has been operating in the region with different impact on the future of the country. Turkey has been held up as a very positive, proactive player who wishes to extend the area of influence. The United States has been operating inside the region over a wide spectrum from clandestine to political to direct aid, with both positive and negative results. Ethiopia and Kenya both with large populations of Somalis have both border concerns and internal agendas.

The mythical structure of the AU being relevant to Somalia should be re-examined and the regions role as a maritime center, food producer, oil producer and force for stability should be written anew. AMISOM should no longer pretend to be a UN or African fielded force but rather a US proxy force and piracy should no longer be talked about in plush conferences but dealt with swiftly on the ground.

Conversely Islamic insurgent movements in Yemen, Kenya, Ethiopia and al-Shabaab should be brought to a formal forum to understand how the new Somalia can avoid the senseless violence perpetrated in the name of God. If al-Shabaab wishes to adopt something other than a 7th century political agenda they should be welcomed. If not they should be treated as a violent antisocial cult. The short reign of the ICU was no more the future of Somalia as were the old colonial structure.

Finally the world needs to recognize that Somaliland is indeed a nation having earned that title after two decades of patient progress. Puntland has chosen to stay within the larger framework of Somalia but once they have oil revenue, there is little stopping them from looking north to their largest trading partner, the UAE, and away from Mogadishu if political solutions are not beneficial. Somaliland has been married to Ethiopia for a while and Kenya will not simply up and leave Jubaland without capitalizing on their military investment. Whether Somalia sees success as a basket of clan based fiefdoms or a unified border-free nation is the decision of Somalis not the outside world.

Somalia vs Afghanistan

Somalia is destined to be yet another developing nation with a bustling capital, where everyone pauses for a few minutes after a large boom and then goes back to their business. Baghdad, Kabul and Mogadishu have become these new centers of growth. Neither at war or at peace but taking a more pragmatic approach towards their nihilistic incendiary brethren. Caught between a rapidly growing economy and a shrinking security apparatus there is little civilians can do except hope they are not the victim of sporadic, apolitical violence. Slowly the appeal of jihad will fade and if Somalis get grass root politics right, there will be no need to splatter oneself to get attention from the government. Somalia may be better suited for success. A vigorous diaspora, strategically located, underutilized resources and an entrepreneurial energy that has created successes amongst chaos portend hope. Afghanistan has suffered from political meddling, an overbearing military presence and a deliberate blindspot to of the traditional political structures that were ignored in favor of a unified modern political system. Somalia is also effectively under the control of hired foreign troops which have no clear exit strategy. Just as America used the correct political structure and tactics to topple the Taliban in three weeks, but stayed ten years too long, Somalia and AMISOM may share the same fate. The UN has taken twenty years to get one month away from a legitimate government but AMISOM (or its morphed successor) find themselves stuck in an endless fixed battle against endless insurgent hit and run attacks. The next time the UN sits down to extend AMISOM is January 2013. It remains to be seen how the then functioning Somali government will view their babysitters. Much like a massive ISAF and American presence allows President Karzai to stay alive, will Somalia protect their own government from the tattered or resurgent threads of Islamic fundamentalists?

The Horn Relief aid organization has announced that they have changed their name to ADESO (African Development Solutions) after two decades of operations in East Africa. The announcement was made at a 20th anniversary celebration held in Nairobi on Thursday, attended by more than 180 representatives from governments, diplomatic missions, United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector participants.

“Over 20 years ago, we began our work in one town, in Badhan, Somalia. Now we are working with communities in three African countries: Somalia, Kenya and South Sudan. We are a very different organization today than we were in 1991,” said Degan Ali, ADESO’s Executive Director. “We touch countless lives in Kenya and Somalia: women, youth and pastoralists, as well as returning refugees in South Sudan. Having worked with this new brand for over a year now, we feel it best captures where we came from, our growth, and where we are today,” she added.

“Today, we are bringing yet another change to the organization by adopting a new name, ADESO, and a new image. As always, however, we remain committed to improving livelihoods and enabling communities to stand on their own feet,” read a statement from ADESO.

Fatima Jibrell, the founder of Horn Relief, was among the guest speakers at the event.

“I was devastated by what was happening to the country of my birth, Somalia: what was happening to its people, its women and youth, and its environment,” said Mrs. Jibrell.

“The need to create change drove much of the work I have done, and led me to found this organization,” she added.

The founder of Horn Relief and current senior advisor to the organization, Fatima Jibrell was living in the US before 1991, but was devastated by what was happening to Somalia and decided to return to her country of birth. She founded a small grassroots organization dedicated to helping the Somalia pastoralist groups, particularly women and youth.

“When the Somali civil war started, I was living in USA with a comfortable life, but I couldn’t enjoy life in the USA while the Somali people starved and suffered back home. People were dying in Baidoa and Mogadishu, as well as in other regions in Somalia, so we decided to migrate to our country so that I could help my people. My children and I settled down in Somalia and started working, at first in only two towns, and from this came this great work we are doing now,” Fatima Jibrell told Somalia Report.

“We urge all Somalia people to preserve the environment. The tree is alive, a living creature like humans that needs care and preservation. People should not use living trees for charcoal, if there is a need for charcoal, then you should not uproot the tree entirely, but cut only pieces from it, so that it can continue to grow and exist,” she advised.

According to the founder, there have been many barriers faced by the organization since it started its work in Somalia. Al-Shabaab militants have closed down all their offices in the areas under their control. Three years ago, the agency faced its greatest difficult after their chief officer in Kismayo was killed and all the equipment in the office was looted. In 2009 in the Sool region of northern Somalia, a security staff member of the organization was killed.

ADESO now works in three African countries, including South Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. The organization is headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, but recognized as a charity in the USA, UK and Kenya. They have nine field offices: four in Kenya, three in Somalia and two in South Sudan, which employ approximately 40 staff in Nairobi and nearly 200 staff in the field.

Now an international non-governmental organization, ADESO is committed to an Africa that is not dependent on aid but on the resourcefulness and capabilities of her people. In 2003, ADESO — then known as Horn Relief — launched the largest charity service seen to date in Somalia. Since then, the organization has emerged as a leader in a new field, providing guidance and trainings to other organizations, and having implemented more than 20 charity services across three countries.

Each year, 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden, a vital shipping route for international trade that connects the Middle East to Europe and North and South America, according to experts. But the route is now rife with danger from Somali pirate gangs. In response to the danger, the European Union (EU) deployed naval forces to the Gulf of Aden under Operation Atalanta to conduct counter-piracy patrols, the first EU operational naval deployment outside Europe.

China too sent destroyers and a supply ship 4,000 miles to fight Somali piracy, their first operational out-of-area deployment in the history of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. In addition, the US, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, among others, also joined the anti-piracy operations.

With nearly all powers in the world seemingly ready to fight the crime, people like General Galaal, who once served Somalia as a minister, intelligence chief and senior military officer, harbor serious doubts concerning their intention.

“These men with the naval warships have the capability to detect the slightest sound of submarines, 30 meters deep inside the sea, they also have the capacity to intercept VHF communications between the cartels and the pirates, so it’s impossible for them not to foil piracy plans by intercepting their communications,” says Galaal.

Galaal wonders why these international forces cannot detect pirates-operating in eight meters long vessels with two engines that make crackling sound louder than that of jet fighters, when they can see a dolphin 500 nautical miles from them In the night.

Localization of Anti-Piracy Strategies

Galaal says the campaign should be redesigned to bear the intended fruits and close the chapter on piracy for good.

“At the moment, over 28 countries from all continents are directly involved in the fight against piracy. Somalia is not involved and has no visible role in the campaign apart from mere verbal outcries intended to get money. It has been so for a long time and the result is what we see today,” says the former army man.

He asserts that Somalia should spearhead the campaign and the international community limit itself to providing technical and material support. He further says that the former Somali navy and the ground troops should be reshuffled to fight piracy.

“Even though most regional administrations in Somalia would not welcome the former military personnel of Mohamed Siad Barre, it is important to re-group the former Somali navy and the ground troops so as to wipeout pirates, al-Shabaab terrorists and al-Qaeda,” says Galaal.

Galaal points out the need for over 2,610 heavily armed personnel on the ground with armored carriers supported by light aircrafts “Turbo Eric” to counter pirates in and outside the seas.

Although piracy and terrorism are treated differently, Galaal links the al-Shabaab, a group the United Nations (UN) and the US designated as terrorist and the pirates, alleging that they are one and the same.

“There is close cooperation between al-Shabaab and pirates. The pirates promise shares of the huge amounts they get through ransom to al-Shabaab, and in return the al-Shabaab assures the former of security. They protect them from any attackers from the mainland,” he adds.

He alleges that al-Shabaab is essential for the success of these illegal activities since the pirates have no substantial influence on land.

“If they are attacked from the mainland, where their bases are located, their activities will be ruined since they cannot continue with their piracy activities in the sea and when assured of their security on the mainland, they can thrive for very long,” claims the General Galaal.

He says real clout of the mission depends on the way in which the former Somali navy officers are reorganized. He emphasized on required technicalities, saying that forming two brigades of the former Somali navy can stamp out these criminal activities. He recommends that one of the brigades operate from Mogadishu to Hobyo, while the other one patrols Ras Aseyr to Ayl. Galaal believes that if these brigades are enabled to reach up to 500 nautical miles deep inside the sea, and are supported from the land, they can defeat pirates.

He faulted the current efforts by both the international forces and the Somali government to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia in its entirety. The former military man also criticized Somalia effort to fight piracy, saying that the now three year old government has failed in the campaign to safeguard international waters.

Asked whether he has shared this experience and recommendations with the Somali government, he said, “They are not ready to accept any ideal contributions from other professionals.”

He accused the government of failing to select qualified professionals to head its anti-piracy efforts.

“They just appoint officers without considering their profession or experience,” he exclaimed.

He further blamed the TFG for “taking refuge within AMISOM instead of liberating the country from pirates, al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups.”

“They are in office for three years and have done nothing apart from existing under AMISOM troops who are continuously shelling the city,” he said.

If Galaal’s views hold some truth, then piracy off the coast of Somalia is far from defeated and the current fight against this crime may be a fruitless and costly endeavor.

NATO Operation Ocean Shield Public Affairs Officer Responds To General Galaal's Questions

1. The anti-piracy forces are either avoiding and neglecting or deliberately closing their eyes on the issue

NATO has been a continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden / Indian Ocean since March 2009. The primary aim of our counter piracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield is to deter and disrupt piracy and our statistics show that. For example in 2009, 18 ships were hijacked in the Gulf of Aden and in 2011 only 1 ship was hijacked. NATO and other naval forces are very aware of the threat of piracy to the merchant community and remains committed to deterring it through the ships and MPAs we have in the region.

2. International cartels who are experts in marine piracy have joined the Somali sea gangs, making the situation too dangerous for global supply chain, which already was reeling from the worldwide economic slowdown.

We have no evidence that international cartels have joined the pirates.

3. These foreign piracy experts, use VHF radio calls to contact with Somali pirates, so it is no possible that these forces don’t intercept or listen to these type of communications.

VHF is an open channel and is monitored by numerous organisations. In addition, ships in the area will monitor it for any emergency messages.

4. The fight should be refaced to bear the intended fruits and close the chapter of piracy, so Somalis should directly be involved in the fight and the international community should provide technical and material support. Do you believe this can work out?

Any solution to the issue of Somali piracy needs to involve the international community and the authorities ashore in Somalia.

On February 8th, Harrie Harrison, the spokesman for EU NAVFOR, responded to Somalia Report's request for comments on the general's quotes.

1. I believe that the anti-piracy forces are either avoiding and neglecting or deliberately closing their eyes on the issue

The European Union is concerned with the continuing impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia on international maritime security and on the economic activities and security of countries in the region.

As a result and as part of a comprehensive approach, the EU has launched European Naval Force Somalia – Operation ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR – ATALANTA) within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International Law.

After the launch of EU NAVFOR –ATALANTA in December 2008, the operation continues in cooperation with other maritime forces (NATO, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), and individual deployers) to successfully perform its mission and contributes to improving maritime security off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean

2. International cartels who are experts in marine piracy have joined the Somali sea gangs, making the situation too dangerous for global supply chain, which already was reeling from the worldwide economic slowdown.

EU NAVFOR has no evidence that international cartels have joined Somali pirates.

3. These foreign piracy experts use VHF radio calls to contact with Somali pirates, so it is not possible that these forces don’t intercept or listen to these type of communications?

Warships monitor VHF radio for navigational safety and SOLAS.

4. The fight should be refaced to bear the intended fruits and close the chapter of piracy, so Somalis should directly be involved in the fight and the international community should provide technical and material support.

The political objective of the EU are to make targeted, specific and coordinated contributions to ongoing international efforts. The EU's aim to prevent and deter pirates from interrupting global maritime trade but also to contribute to a sustainable and long-term solution to piracy through building-up the capacity of the states in the region, including Somalia, to take ownership of the fight against piracy.

First, the European Union works towards eradicating the root causes of piracy by contributing to the social and economic development of Somalia, concentrating on three sectors of cooperation: governance, education, and the productive sectors, particularly rural development. Restoring the rule of law through support of Somali-owned governance and security sector initiatives is another EU objective as well as to contribute to the establishment of a peaceful, stable and democratic country.

Second, the EU already actively works towards improving security on the ground in Somalia through the empowerment of Somali capacities: EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) which trains Somali soldiers in Uganda to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia.

· The European Union is planning for the launch of a possible new civilian training mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in order to strengthen the maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. On 12 December 2011, the Council adopted the Crisis Management Concept which lays the ground for a technical assessment mission in the region. On the basis of this work, the preparation of the mission itself will start and its launch, to be decided by the Council, could translate into the deployment of personnel around mid-2012.

RMCB would consist of two components addressing two main objectives:

· Strengthen the sea going maritime capacity of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles.

· Train and equip the Coastal Police Force in the Somali regions of Puntland, Somaliland and Galmudug, as well as train and protect judges in the Somali region of Puntland.

RMCB is an important element in the EU's comprehensive approach to fighting piracy, as it allows maximising synergies between military and civilian capabilities. The EU has formed strategic partnerships with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to execute and deliver this mission.

Complementarity with other EU-funded projects related to maritime security will also be crucial. The Critical Maritime Routes Programme under the Instrument for Stability, in place since 2009, has been in the forefront of addressing the maritime capacity building needs in the Western Indian Ocean region, focusing on training and information sharing. The envisaged support under the European Development Fund to assist the Eastern and Southern African – Indian Ocean Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Promoting Maritime Security ('Regional Strategy') will also contribute strongly to ongoing EU efforts.

Finally, this mission will also work in an integrated and complementary manner with other interventions of the European Union, especially humanitarian aid and development cooperation.

In addition, the EU offers substantial financial and technical support to the African Union's military mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Additional EU funding of €67 million for costs until July 2012 will bring the EU contribution to AMISOM to a total of €325 million since 2007. AMISOM supports dialogue and reconciliation and provides protection to key infrastructures (e.g. government buildings and the Mogadishu International Airport) to enable the Transitional Federal Government and Institutions to carry out their functions. The mission is also assisting in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation plan, providing support to disarmament and stabilisation efforts, as well as facilitating humanitarian operations, including repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons. The EU has been one of the main funders of the operation, primarily through the African Peace Facility. The EU covers costs such as mission allowances, medical care, accommodation, fuel, and communication equipment.

To sum up, the EU deploys in a coordinated manner a number of instruments in addition to EU NAVFOR. In December 2011, an EU Special Representative to the Horn of Africa - Mr. Alexander Rondos – was appointed in order to best coordinate them, thus supporting regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security and development. Initially, the Special Representative was asked by the Council to focus on Somalia and the regional dimensions of the conflict there, as well as on piracy, which has its root causes in the instability of Somalia.

The European Union adopted on 14 November 2011 a "Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa" to guide the EU's engagement in the region. The Strategic Framework sets out the way in which the EU will pursue its strategic approach, working in partnership with the region itself, in particular the African Union, and key international partners. It defines five priorities for EU action: building robust and accountable political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth, and supporting regional economic cooperation (see Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, as adopted by the Council on 14 November 2011.

Dysfunction seems to be a hallmark of Somalia’s recent history with uncoordinated and random events acting as tipping points that plunge Somalia into yet another era of misery. Black Hawk Down was a tiny but important "Black Swan", the pirating of the MV Faina another, and the Kenyan invasion promises to be the latest.

Instead of the typical violence, corruption, lassitude and despair seen in failed states, Somalia exhibits a fascinating mix of good and evil that cohabit the same timeframe and solution. If there is poverty, then there are pirates making tens of millions from simple ship grabs. If there is starvation, there are warehouses stocked high with food unable to be distributed due to violence. If there is drought, there are also floods that prevent delivery of water.

If industrious Somaliland is held up as the way forward for governance, there is the quasi pirate/criminal state of Galmudug to warn against factionalism and self interest. If the preferred international solution is the TFG, then clans and even neighbors like Kenya and Ethiopia are sure to get busy carving off chunks to protect their self interest. It almost appears impossible to find a consensus let alone a quorum on how to help the troubled nation.

An Engaging Policy of Disengagement

Despite what you hear or read, the US has been very active in and around Somalia since the 1998 embassy bombings. There are US contractors on the ground doing the Agency's work and there is a robust assassination program against al Qaeda. But Americans are to believe that we are not involved or interested in Somalia.

In the latest televised GOP political debate, a question regarding Somalia and al-Shabaab was asked by AEI analyst Katherine Zimmerman of candidate Ron Paul. His answer:

You mean al Qaeda? You have to understand who the al Qaeda really is. The - the al Qaeda responds in a very deliberate fashion. As a matter of fact, Paul Wolfowitz explained it very clearly after 9/11. He said that al Qaeda is inspired by the fact that we had bases in Saudi Arabia. So if you want to inspire al Qaeda, just meddle in - in that region. That will inspire the al Qaeda....They are quite annoyed with us. So if you drop - if you have a no - fly zone over Syria, that's an act of war. What if we had China put a no-fly zone over our territory? I don't think - I don't think we would like that."

So much for insight from future political leaders on Somalia and emerging threats.

Although Paul did not address the specific question of what can America do to prevent the of rise al-Shabaab in Somalia, he did try to answer America's "policy of disengagement".

“If you want to inspire al Qaeda just meddle in that region." The answer of course had nothing to do with question but it showed how the US views Somalia. We are "meddling" with some well oiled or predestined outcome, a view that is as untrue about Somalia as it is about any tiny dysfunctional failed state. The smallest push or assistance in the right direction has significant impact in Somalia.

Somalia is not just another troublesome dustbowl haven for terrorists. It is not a place that should be bombed by Predator drones but never actually officially touched by US combat boots. Somalia is a geo-strategic region that has major impact on the global economy, security and America's ambitions in the region. While many big thinking pundits focus on the Straits of Hormuz, they forget that with a modicum of military training and equipping Somali pirates could shut down traffic in the Gulf of Aden. The 25 mile wide Bab al Mandeb and Gulf of Aden can be just as strategic to the safety of global shipping as the 34 mile wide Straits of Hormuz.

The 40 or so Americans and two dozen Brits currently training and fighting in Somalia are just the tip of the terrorist iceberg for exported terrorism. Somalia, by its vast diaspora, sea and air access is a springboard for deadly skill sets into the Middle East, Asia, South Asia, Europe and the West. It is the region where the War on Terror began and will be mostly likely the last battleground for countries affected by exported jihadist violence. Perhaps the answer should have been, "If you want to defeat al Qaeda, just help in that region."

In a clear confirmation of the importance of the need to gain popular support, al-Shabaab's biggest political mistake was to block the desperately needed flow of western aid. As Kenya and Ethiopia enters towns, they find little if any resistance to their entry.

The brief exchange between researcher and political candidates seemed to reflect the American position on the most recent invasion debacle in Somalia.

Has one of Africa's least experienced armies been delegated to meddle on our behalf? Knowledgeable Somali watchers have a sense that either Kenya is America's canary in a the Somali coal mine or a dead duck. America's engagement with disengagement may mean there might not be a cavalry to come to Kenya's rescue if they are stuck.

A Comedy of Terrors

There appears to be multiple, competing agendas at play, none of them robust, few of them successful and none linked together. The diplomatic equivalent of a Marx Bros movie. For example, the fight against piracy has its onshore and off shore disconnect. JSOC anti terrorism activities in the region clearly define going after foreign jihadis versus Somalia ones. Governments and aid agencies routinely put plenty of plywood between ransom demands and their responsibility to protect their citizens from harm. Bifurcation and opposing goals rule.

The US has based its anti-terrorism intelligence gathering assets out of Nairobi for a dozen years but somehow the public is supposed to believe that the US embassy was caught flat-flooted when Kenya invaded Somalia on October 16. Even though Kenya presented their plans to the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Johnnie Carson for US approval one year earlier.

The competing self interests, badly stated motivations and unaligned regional agendas seem custom made for disaster.

The recent Kenya incursion was pinned on defeating terrorists who had invaded Kenya to harm tourism and later, to help aid workers. In reality it appears to be plain old pirates turning to land based kidnapping were responsible. Pirates have no connection with al-Shabaab and less with Kenya efforts. Kenya immediately began blaming civilian casualties as a result of army attacks in refugee camps and at sea on al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab responded by killing more Kenyan's inside Kenya than Kenyan soldiers inside Somalia.

To add irony and more humor, Ethiopia then invaded. Firmly stressing that it supports Kenya and AMISOM’s mission while denying it had actually invaded. This would all be black comedy if used to write a script but sadly it is a very real strategy in the region to play off the lack of media coverage and public awareness. Note to budding scriptwriters: AMISOM was set up as a result of the chaos created by Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion and forbids Kenya and Ethiopia from participating.

The current invasion free for all set off a rapid fire, uncoordinated series of events that threatens to shift Somalia into a separate set of random problems rather than a coordinated outside effort to neatly solve things like the drought, governance, poverty and lack of security. Aid organizations are already complaining that the Kenya invasion (re-pitched by spokesman a few days after invasion to be a way to bring in aid to the Somalia people) is preventing them from delivering food and help. There is a disturbing pattern emerging here.

To keep the punch lines coming. yesterday Johnnie Carson cautioned Ethiopia, its proxy ally against al Shabaab against invading Somalia. The problem is he was three days too late. To add counterpoint, the European Union (EU) spoke out in support of the Kenya invasion. Making sure the three beat structure of comedy was respected, former President of Ghana and African Union special envoy for Somalia, Jerry Rawling urged Kenya and Ethiopia and whoever else was pounding on the IED and suicide vest loving jihadis to "not shut the door to combatant elements who would want to put aside their weapons and talk politics". Drum roll. Ba da boom.

Ethiopia at the same time denies its troops have invaded Somalia or are inside it’s borders while numerous eye witnesses report Ethiopian army units entering Balanbale district in Galmudug region in central Somalia.

Ethiopia in a clumsy attempt to conceal their invasion tasked government spokesman Bereket Simon to insist to Reuters that "This is absolutely false. The army is within the Ethiopian border. There is no intention to go back . Going “back” would also be a key talking point to the current president of Somalia, Sheik Sharif who fought the Ethiopians in 2007 and had to flee the country when pursued by U.S. and Ethiopian military. Another drum roll, Folks, please save the applause for the end.

The Fragmented Future

Even with Kenya government frequent flyer miles piling up due to frenetic shuttle diplomacy, a sense of disconnect and chaos should continue based on the latest discussions between invasion partners. The TFG reacted with horror to Kenya’s invasion but was quickly schooled to begrudgingly submit to the unwanted military probing of Somalia’s nether regions. The forced public show of unity is not going to magically remove Somalia's historically proven reaction to foreign military intervention.

The apparently, Post-It sized strategic planning used to launch Kenya’s untested army was bad enough. But the premise that launching 2000 troops into Jubaland to grab Kismayo would be enough to stabilize Jubaland is optimistic. Exactly what is required to "stabilize" the border region and prevent terror attacks from al Shabaab inside Kenya? The world waits patiently for the magic formula. Kenya has not even explained how it will hold Kismayo once invaded.

To add perspective Kismayo has barely a couple of hundred thousand Somali’s about half of Dadaab refugee’s camps. There are between a million and 3 million ethnic Somali’s in Kenya. Current counterinsurgency rule of thumb is around one security person for 250 residents. That is where AMISOM gets it's "12000" troop requirement estimates for Mogadishu and pencils out to around 800 peacekeepers just for Kismayo alone. This does not include the vast distances of Jubland and the border or AMISON shortfalls. 2012 is going to get interesting.

AMISOM is already complaining about being a few million light on its financial requirements just for Mogadishu. Both France and the U.S. have both publicly distanced themselves from the adventure.

The strategy makes no mention of how Kenya intends to destabilize the much larger refugee and illegal population of Somali’s inside Kenya and convince them to return home. Their crackdown's in Eastliegh and along the border have simply led to more violence inside Kenya.

On Saturday Kenya was defending their previous meetings in Addis Ababa to invite Ethiopians to join their foray. Something that has most observers on edge. Ethiopia’s rough handed invasion and occupation created al-Shabaab after the Islamic Courts were destroyed.

In an optimistic but completely bizarre comment, Kenyan military spokesman said Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir said, “Ethiopia is supposed to build (military) capacity in Somalia. That could apply to cross-border operations.” Apparently Kenya's view of Ethiopia is akin to telling Californian's that the Mexican Army will help with crime in Los Angeles.

On Thursday Kenya made an official request that the US provide intelligence and surveillance since it already has significant naval, air and special operations assets in the region. It appears that the American “Stand Off” position on hunting down al Qaeda terrorists in Somalia makes the more robust Kenya effort embarrassing. It was after all the US that equipped and trained Kenya’s army for the invasion.

A Clown Car Powered by Diplomatic Dissonance

Diplomats with their hectic schedules, can be excused for being behind the Somalia information curve. But not intelligence agencies. The United States maintains impressive assets inside Somalia allowing them to continue to conduct air strikes against al Qaeda targets, training bases and even convoys inside Southern Somalia. The same targets that un-smart aging Kenya air force bombs have promised to hit...sort of.

The U.S. has paid $700 million to support Kenya's military, and untold millions to arm and support AMISOM, They also previously supported Ethiopia’s incursions and dropped off cash to fund proxy forces to defeat al-Shabaab

Yet American diplomats have been steadfastly unimpressed by the Kenyan and now Ethiopian venture.

The US finds itself looking like a truculent spoil sport on one hand creating the dual track program to support essentially anyone who fought al-Shabaab and ignoring Kenya for doing what they did in Afghanistan but dared not do in Somalia. Pull out terrorism by it’s roots.

The US is now warning Ethiopia, the very same allies they used to clear out the Islamic Courts. To aid poignancy, the American backed moderate-ish Islamist President Sheik Sharif who was a senior member of the ICU now finds himself supported the return of Ethiopia to aid Kenya and biting his tongue as they cheerfully offer to join AMISOM, a de facto occupying army of foreign troops.

Confusion on Land....and Sea

The chaos is not confined to land. Today the UN reaffirmed its commitment to provide authorization for those cooperating with Somali Government to use all necessary means to combat piracy”

This sweeping document provides "authorization for States and regional organizations cooperating with the Somali Transitional Federal Government to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “all necessary means” — such as deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, as well as seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms and related equipment used for piracy" Note the term "regional organizations" which could within the broad strokes of this mandate be anything from TFG-hired private security firms to government contracted repo man/bounty hunters.

This appeared to be unintentionally synced up with EU's announcement that due to fiscal problems they will have a problem finding navy ships for the region. This is also the same UN that is working overtime to shut down an indigenous government sponsored program in Puntland specifically set up to fight piracy on land using foreign contracted trainers while the U.S is aggressively promoting OK with foreign security guards on ships in the region.

Overarching all this call to foreign adventuring, profiteering and social engineering the UN continues to work against "the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries would contribute to the eradication of these nefarious activities and thereby to the observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations" It is difficult to chose between the term irony or hypocrisy when sorting out these competing activities within the same theater.

Lost amongst the current chaos seems to be the Kampala Accord (let alone the Djibouti Agreement) which sets a timetable for the Somali people to actually choose their own government and reap the benefits of what looked like a minor movement towards stability when al-Shabaab left Mogadishu.